What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions.

Somos testemunhas e participantes de transformações profundas da ciência, técnica e Lebenswelt, que as gerações futuras possivelmente considerarão uma revolução. Como surgiu essa evolução? Em que se fundamenta esta necessidade de uma elucidação da pergunta pela essência do homem e dos demais seres vivos? Este artigo tenta dar uma resposta provisória a tais questões, recorrendo a posições clássicas da antropologia filosófica e a acontecimentos relevantes na teoria das ciências e na história das ciências. Em seguida, a autora apresenta sua concepção (...) de bioética, tirando, então, algumas consequências concernentes à antropologia, à filosofia da natureza e à ética. (shrink)

The author takes a collection of essays on concepts and approaches in evolutionary epistemology as the occasion for a critical discussion of the limits and achievements of evolutionary epistemology as well as of certain philosophical objections to the very project itself. She comes to the conclusion that evolutionary epistemology, even if it cannot explain cognition itself, can nevertheless shed light on the complex phenomenon of cognition by demonstrating the presence of traces of our evolutionary past in cognition. Modern research into (...) the structure and functioning of the brain supports this conclusion. The author argues that the questions which evolutionary epistemology can legitimately pose and answer are such that it is not in competition with traditional epistemology. For this reason she suggests that this research program be renamed "evolutionäre Informationstheorie", in the hope that its aims will become clearer to proponents as well as opponents. In the final section the author discusses the possibility that an evolutionary approach might explain the fact that human beings are less and less capable of dealing with the complexity of the world they have created. (shrink)

The author takes the interdisciplinary seminar on Evolutionary Epistemology at the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium as the occasion to discuss the question of the status, achievements and limits of Evolutionary Epistemology. She comes to the conclusion that neither its critique of the quid juris question in traditional epistemology nor its own philosophical pretensions can be justified. But it is a new science which is relevant and a challenge to traditional epistemology and philosophy of science in that it opens up a (...) horizon of new questions which they will have to take seriously. (shrink)

Nagel ist es nicht geglückt, die Möglichkeit des Verzichts auf teleologische Formulierungen und Erklärungen plausibel zu begründen. Bei seinem Versuch, die Äquivalenz teleologischer und nichtteleologischer Erklärungen nachzuweisen und den Bedeutungsüberschuß teleologischer Sprache hinwegzuformulieren, ist er immer schon an die Voraussetzung dieses Bedeutungsüberschusses gebunden, dessen er sich nicht, wie seine Beschreibung zielgerichteter Systeme beweist, entledigen kann. Unser Ergebnis dispensiert jedoch nicht von der Frage, ob der Anspruch 'der in teleologischen Wendungen geltend gemacht wird, auch zu Recht besteht. Denn die semantische Unmöglichkeit (...) der Reduktion von Relevanzrelationen auf Bedingungsrelationen verbürgt ja noch nicht, daß die teleologische Sprache den Gegenstandsbereich der Biologie auch adäquat trifft. Eine über unsere Studie hinausgehende Untersuchung müßte daher die hier aufgeworfene Frage in den größeren Zusammenhang der als klassisch geltenden Stellungnahmen einbetten und unter Einbeziehung der Resultate der kybernetischen Wissenschaften dem Problem nachgehen, ob Teleologie nur heuristischer Leitfaden der Reflexion ist, der aus forschungsstrategischen Gründen der Organisation des Gegenstandes an diesen von außen herangetragen wird, oder darüberhinaus eine Struktureigenschaft von Objekten selbst bezeichnet. Ist Teleologie also nur eine "Sache der Formulierung" oder eine "Formulierung der Sache"? (shrink)

The author discusses the question, if sociobiology can be relevant for the conceptual foundations of ethics. She comes to the conclusion that sociobiology cannot reduce the meaning of moral terms to that of sociobiological discourse, but that sociobiology might nevertheless be able to shed light on the complex phenomenon of morality by demonstrating the presence of traces of our evolutionary past in our behavior. Thereby sociobiology might be relevant for elucidating the relation between »can« and »ought«, that is, for the (...) question of practicability of moral norms. (shrink)

This article explores the disconnection between what pre-professional students expect from college and what their undergraduate education might foster, between the focus on “getting into medical school” and the development of humanistic physicians. It reviews the longstanding challenge inherent in helping pre-meds acquire not only sufficient scientific background but also well-developed interpersonal skills to help them understand patients’ experience of illness and their own interactions with other members of the health care team. Clinical experiences from the NEH Institute are interpreted (...) from the perspective of a pre-med advisor who also teaches literature; they are also incorporated into an undergraduate course on literature about illness. (shrink)

BackgroundFreezing of gait is a disabling burden for Parkinson’s disease patients with poor response to conventional therapies. Combined deep brain stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus and substantia nigra moved into focus as a potential therapeutic option to treat the parkinsonian gait disorder and refractory FoG. The mechanisms of action of DBS within the cortical-subcortical-basal ganglia network on gait, particularly at the cortical level, remain unclear.MethodsTwelve patients with idiopathic PD and chronically-implanted DBS electrodes were assessed on their regular dopaminergic medication in (...) a standardized stepping in place paradigm. Patients executed the task with DBS switched off, conventional STN DBS and combined STN+SN DBS and were compared to healthy matched controls. Simultaneous high-density EEG and kinematic measurements were recorded during resting-state, effective stepping, and freezing episodes.ResultsClinically, STN+SN DBS was superior to conventional STN DBS in improving temporal stepping variability of the more affected leg. During resting-state and effective stepping, the cortical activity of PD patients in STIM OFF was characterized by excessive over-synchronization in the theta, alpha, and high-beta band compared to healthy controls. Both active DBS settings similarly decreased resting-state alpha power and reduced pathologically enhanced high-beta activity during resting-state and effective stepping compared to STIM OFF. Freezing episodes during STN DBS and STN+SN DBS showed spectrally and spatially distinct cortical activity patterns when compared to effective stepping. During STN DBS, FoG was associated with an increase in cortical alpha and low-beta activity over central cortical areas, while with STN+SN DBS, an increase in high-beta was prominent over more frontal areas.ConclusionsSTN+SN DBS improved temporal aspects of parkinsonian gait impairment compared to conventional STN DBS and differentially affected cortical oscillatory patterns during regular locomotion and freezing suggesting a potential modulatory effect on dysfunctional cortical-subcortical communication in PD. (shrink)

Ce commentaire présente trois arguments de la pensée potterienne à partir de la lunette ergothérapique afin de soutenir les réflexions relatives au développement des pratiques durables en ergothérapie. Il permet ainsi d’initier les ergothérapeutes à une perspective de bioéthique globale susceptible de les soutenir dans l’actualisation d’une approche écosystémique respectueuse de l’environnement.

In contemporary philosophy and social theory, Harbermas's theory of communicative action stands indisputably for a modernity enlightened about itself and its potential. Yet, however much he professes his commitment to universalist ideals of inclusiveness and equality, his influential theory is also marked by disquieting statements on matters of gender. I argue that the problem of gender in Habermas's theory can be traced to his attempt to rework the Marxian tradition of historical materialism. I do so by discussing Habermas's proposal for (...) reconstructing this tradition, and examining the system/lifeworld distinction on which the theory of communicative action is based. Regarding, I direct attention to his argument that the Marxian concept of social labor cannot account for the specifically human form of reproducing life; a theory of social evolution and historical progress requires equal recognition of socialization processes and the moral-practical insight transmitted through those processes. I show that Habermas attributes a special value to the "female" labor of socialization and that he conceptualizes such labor as outside "social" labor. Regarding, I argue that while Habermas's system/lifeworld distinction in the context of historical materialism makes possible a more complex interpretation of Marx and Engels understanding of the basic components of social labor, his theory of communicative action-like his proposal for reconstructing historical materialism-reproduces the Marxian exclusion of "female" labor from social labor. (shrink)

This article questions the commonly accepted belief that God, like a ceramic potter, is able to control the outcome of events even as the potter controls the outcome of the clay-throwing process. However, those who are familiar with the artistic process of creating with clay know well that this is a symbiotic dynamic between the creator and the clay, as is that between God and human events.

A central theme of law and society is that people's ideas about law and the decisions they make to mobilize law are shaped by community norms and cultural context. But this was not always an established concept. Among the first empirical pieces to articulate this theory was David Engel's 1984 article, 'The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community'. Over thirty years later, this article is now widely considered to be part of the law (...) and society canon. This book argues that Engel's article succeeds so brilliantly because it integrates a wide variety of issues, such as cultural transformation, attitudes about law, dispute processing, legal consciousness, rights mobilization, inclusion and exclusion, and inequality. Contributors to this volume explore the influence of Engel's important work, engaging with the possibilities in its challenging hypotheses and provocative omissions related to the legal system and legal process, class conflict and difference, and law in other cultures. (shrink)

In her recent case study, Elizabeth Potter attempts to show how Boyle's experimental method was biased by gender considerations. Part of her argument focuses on the combination of the “invisibility” of women in Boyle's published work together with his unpublished comments on female chastity, and part concerns Boyle's rejection of the animistic explanation of his air pump experiments by Francis Line. I argue that the historical and biographical elements of the case make Potter's arguments questionable. In addition, I (...) address whether and how such historical cases can shed light on current debates about gender issues and argue that Boyle's methodological writings could be used to better advantage in the feminist cause. (shrink)

Estamos a un año del cincuentenario de la aparición formal de la bioética en el escenario científico global. El afortunado neologismo usado por Potter en 1970 para vincular las ciencias experimentales con las ciencias humanísticas, creando un enfoque interdisciplinar indispensable -esencia de la bioética-, el cual pretende recuperar el liderazgo de la filosofía -particularmente de la ética- a fin de orientar apropiadamente los desarrollos de las ciencias prácticas en boga, como la biología, la ecología, la química, la cibernética, las (...) nuevas biotecnologías, la biomedicina, siempre con respeto de la dignidad del ser humano y su entorno. Es necesario estar alerta a ciertas tendencias actuales guiadas principalmente por intereses económicos y posverdad, corrientes transhumanistas que parecieran dar un nuevo giro copernicano en la reflexión científico-filosófica, en donde la esencia del ser humano pareciera esfumarse y quedar al libre arbitrio de las ciencias cibernéticas. ¿Qué hacer entonces? El reto que se vislumbra en el horizonte es volver a descubrir una racionalidad que la sustente, o como Potter decía en 1970: "El conocimiento de cómo utilizar el conocimiento" ¿Qué tan cerca está esta nueva ciencia de alcanzar las metas que su fundador Van Rensselaer Potter propuso para unir las ciencias experimentales con las ciencias humanísticas? ¿La biología con la filosofía, y a su vez destacar la urdimbre jurídica que de manera natural brota ante problemáticas y retos tan relevantes en el ámbito clínico, como son los que aborda y atiende la bioética como ciencia? En este contexto la bioética surge como una disciplina con un especial interés por discernir en esta multitud de nuevas posibilidades lo que es ético de lo que no lo es, lo que humaniza de lo que degrada, lo correcto de lo incorrecto, lo que concuerda con el respeto a la dignidad de las personas o no. De ahí el interés en aportar un conjunto de escritos científicos acerca de sus fundamentos y principales aplicaciones, tanto para personal de salud, alumnos de pregrado y posgrado, docentes, como a quienes pertenecen a comités hospitalarios: abogados, filósofos, representantes religiosos, así como profesionales de otros ámbitos, incluidas la investigación y la práctica clínica, que les permita tomar las decisiones correctas, dentro del marco del derecho sanitario vigente de nuestro país y conforme a los tratados internacionales de los que México es parte. El libro tiene como objetivo presentar a los estudiantes, docentes, investigadores y profesionales de distintas carreras, interesados en este ámbito, los fundamentos antropológicos y humanísticos de la novedosa y polémica ciencia de la bioética, sus campos de aplicación, los dilemas que suelen presentarse, así como algunas propuestas de solución de casos clínicos concretos por un grupo interdisciplinar de académicos de prestigiadas instituciones educativas de nuestro país. (shrink)

Review of Mathematical Knowledge eds. Leng, Paseau, and Potter.

Religious congregations of women have been socialized in a tradition rich in gospel values, but one which was also hierarchical and patriarchal. My own congregation, the Little Company of Mary, is an international one, involved in health care since our foundation in Victorian England. Within both spheres, religious and medical, the patriarchal influence was strong and uncritically accepted until the second half of the twentieth cen tury. Here, I attempt to bring feminist and nursing philosophy to bear on the (...) care debate within nursing. An ethic of care demands that we go beyond competence, important as that is. This ethic, found to be at the heart of our LCM identity, suggests to us today, that our founder, Mary Potter was a feminist ahead of her time. (shrink)

Mary Douglas's retirement lasted almost a quarter of a century, quite long enough for her to fade pottering into obscurity. Yet what happened was diametrically, single-mindedly opposite: an increasing productivity well into her eighties; an unchallengeable position within British anthropology's most brilliant professional generation; and a generous reassessment within her own discipline of the work of her mid-career. Few could have predicted this outcome when in 1977 Douglas resigned her professorship at University College London in order to become Director (...) of Research on Culture at the Russell Sage Foundation in New York. Fewer still as she found herself immediately mired in the controversial sacking of the man who had hired her. Yet Douglas emerged from this fray with risk analysis added to the already formidable range of fields on which she wrote. No field of anthropology–religion, symbolism, politics, economics, cognition, to name only a few–was untouched by her ideas. (shrink)

Four women have been conventionally framed as wives and/or mistresses and/or sexual partners in the biographical reception of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as heterosexual men. These women were Jenny Marx, Helene Demuth, Mary Burns, and Lydia Burns. How exactly they appear in the few contemporary texts and rare images that survive is less interesting than the determination of subsequent biographers of the two “great men” to make these women fit a familiar genre, namely intellectual biography. An analysis of (...) Marx–Engels biographies shows how this masculinized genre enforces an incuriosity that makes gendered political partnerships unthinkable and therefore invisible. By contrast, a positive interest in these women, which rethinks what a gendered political partnership is or could be, results in a significantly different view of the two men. As historical figures, they shift from being individualized or paired‐with‐each‐other “great thinkers” to communist/socialist activists working in and through everyday spaces and material practices. Their pamphlets, articles, and books thus appear more as immediate political interventions and less as timeless theorizing or as the raw material for such intellectualizing reconstructions. (shrink)

Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...) differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief. (shrink)

Many authors assume that we are rationally required to be somewhat moved by any recognized reason. This assumption turns out to be unjustified if not false, both in general and under any non-trivial restriction. Even its most plausible forms are contradicted by the possibility of exclusionary reasons. Some have doubted the latter’s possibility. But these doubts are also shown to be unfounded, and exclusionary reasons’ pervasive role in normative theorizing is defended.

Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.

The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this (...) norm lacks normative force, that it violates the principle that ‘ought implies can,’ and that it is viciously circular. I defend the view that we should distinguish the statement of the objective norm and the way it is regulated, and that this distinction can answer most of the criticisms of the norm of truth for belief. (shrink)

What is truth? What value should we see in or attribute to it? The war over the meaning and utility of truth is at the center of contemporary philosophical debate, and its arguments have rocked the foundations of philosophical practice. In this book, the American pragmatist Richard Rorty and the French analytic philosopher Pascal Engel present their radically different perspectives on truth and its correspondence to reality. Rorty doubts that the notion of truth can be of any practical use (...) and points to the preconceptions that lie behind truth in both the intellectual and social spheres. Engel prefers a realist conception, defending the relevance and value of truth as a norm of belief and inquiry in both science and the public domain. Rorty finds more danger in using the notion of truth than in getting rid of it. Engel thinks it is important to hold on to the idea that truth is an accurate representation of reality. In Rorty's view, epistemology is an artificial construct meant to restore a function to philosophy usurped by the success of empirical science. Epistemology and ontology are false problems, and with their demise goes the Cartesian dualism of subject and object and the ancient problematic of appearance and reality. Conventional "philosophical problems," Rorty asserts, are just symptoms of the professionalism that has disfigured the discipline since the time of Kant. Engel, however, is by no means as complacent as Rorty in heralding the "end of truth," and he wages a fierce campaign against the "veriphobes" who deny its value. _What's the Use of Truth?_ is a rare opportunity to experience each side of this impassioned debate clearly and concisely. It is a subject that has profound implications not only for philosophical inquiry but also for the future study of all aspects of our culture. (shrink)

This paper shows that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory in the sense that the laws of the theory deal with species as irreducible wholes rather than as sets of organisms. 'Species X' is an instantiation of a primitive term of the theory. I present a sketch of a proof that it cannot be defined within the theory as a set of organisms; the proof relies not on details of my axiomatization but rather on a generally accepted property (...) of speciation; hence the same argument should work for any axiomatization which captures this generally accepted property of speciation. (shrink)

Whose values should count – those of patients or the general public – when adopting the quality-adjusted life year framework for healthcare decision making is a long-standing debate. Specific disciplines, such as economics, are not wedded to a particular side of the debate, and arguments for and against the use of patient values have been discussed at length in the literature. In 2012, Sinclair proposed an approach, grounded within patient preference theory, which sought to avoid a perceived unfair discrimination against (...) people with disabilities when using values from the general public. Key assumptions about general public values that beget this line of thinking were that ‘disabled states always tally with lower quality of life’, and the use of standardised instruments means that ‘you are forced into a fixed view of disability as a lower value state’. Drawing on recent contributions to the health economics literature, we contend that such assumptions are not inherent to the incorporation of general public values for the estimation of QALYs. In practice, whether health states of people with disabilities are of ‘lower value’ is, to some extent, a reflection of the health state descriptions that members of the public are asked to value. (shrink)